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                                                   Abstract 
President George W. Bush’s attempt to reform Social Security in 2005 provides 
an opportunity to test the effects of presidential rhetoric on public support.  I analyze 
survey data taken before and after President Bush’s public campaign and I utilize a 
survey experiment conducted in May 2005 to measure the effects of his public campaign 
on support for his Social Security proposal.  My analysis separates members of President 
Bush’s core constituents from the general public.  My findings show that, in general, 
support for the proposal declined after the public campaign, but that the public campaign 
successfully increased support for the Social Security proposal among President Bush’s 
core constituents.  I argue that modern presidents use the ‘bully pulpit’ to speak to their 
core supporters.    
 
Introduction 
 Public support is a strategic asset for the president in pursuing his policy goals 
with Congress (Neustadt 1980).  Conventional wisdom holds that some of our most 
effective presidents achieved their policy goals because they were adept in their appeals 
to the public for support.  And indeed some evidence shows that a president has 
considerable ability to move public attention through a well-crafted public address 
(Cohen 1995a; Tulis 1987; Cohen 1995b).  But more recently a number of studies 
suggest that the conventional wisdom is wrong and presidents are not very effective in 
their appeals to the public (Edwards 2003; Edwards 2007; Edwards 2009).   
 In part, we may have witnessed a decline in presidential influence over public 
attention and opinion that may be the result of developments in the modern era.  For 
example, the proliferation of different media sources has made it increasingly difficult for 
the President to speak directly to the American public without the filter of the media.  
The major television networks are unlikely to broadcast live presidential addresses aside 
from messages regarding scandals, military actions, or the State of the Union address 
(Edwards 2003; Kernell 2007).   
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 In addition, there are segments of the population that presidents are unable to 
reach.  Partisan labels can have considerable influence on how information is processed, 
and political ideology and party identification are persistent and become more 
crystallized with age (Sears and Funk 1999; Rahn 1993).  Fischle showed that people 
who already liked Bill Clinton maintained their high approval ratings of his presidency 
during the Monica Lewinsky scandal.  “Prior attitudes toward Clinton very strongly 
influenced the tendency to perceive the scandal as nothing more than a conspiracy.” 
(Fischle 2000).  Although the promise of moving public opinion through public addresses 
exists, the public is more difficult to reach, less likely to tune in, and very unlikely to be 
moved by a president from a different party.   
 But if some partisans tune out a president who does not share their party label, 
then it is possible that presidential appeals to the public can still have an influence on 
those who belong to the president’s party, and perhaps even some independents.  In fact, 
while analysis of national polls may show little or no change following presidential 
appeals, population sub-groups, such as partisans, may simply be shifting in opposite 
directions but these changes are masked at the aggregate level. 
Because the conflicting arguments in the literature do not clearly settle the 
question of presidential influence, my project explores the impact of George W. Bush’s 
public campaign to reform Social Security on public opinion among his core constituents.  
I argue that although it is unlikely these public appeals increased support for his proposal 
among the general population, Bush may have only been trying to influence support 
amongst his partisan base, and that is where our attention should be focused. 
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I begin with an overview of the literature on presidential rhetorical power and the 
use of issue framing to increase the salience of issues.  I then describe the 2005 public 
campaign by George W. Bush to generate support for his plan to reform Social Security.  
My discussion suggests that George W. Bush thought he had a mandate after the 2004 
presidential election to reform Social Security and his public campaign was an integral 
part of his effort to garner support among his base constituents for his plan and properly 
frame the issue for his core constituents.  Based on the theoretical overview I examine 
individual-level partisan support for Bush’s proposal to reform Social Security.  I employ 
data from two national surveys; one conducted before Bush began his public campaign 
and the other shortly after he began his public campaign.  In addition, I examine data 
from a survey that was conducted at the end of the public campaign because it contains 
an experimental treatment of individual-level responses.  My analysis suggests that 
general support for president Bush’s proposal declined after his public campaign, while 
support for his proposal increased among his core constituents.  I argue that models of 
presidential rhetorical powers that focus exclusively on general public opinion are too 
constrained.  I explore the implications of my findings and offer suggestions for future 
research. 
Theoretical Overview 
The literature on presidential rhetorical power1 is mixed.  Some argue (Edwards 
2003; Edwards 2007; Kernell 2007; Collier and Sullivan 1995) that presidents do not 
have the ability to move public opinion through public addresses, others argue that the 
president can, under certain conditions, move public opinion and change the public’s 
                                                 
1
 “Rhetorical powers,” “going public”, “public appeals”, and the “Bully Pulpit” all refer to the same 
phenomenon of a president using a public address in an attempt to sway public opinion.  For convenience, I 
will use the term “rhetorical powers” in this paper, unless quoting an author that uses a different term. 
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policy preferences by effectively appealing to the public (Cohen 1995a; Druckman and 
Holmes 2004) 
Continuing the work of Neustadt, many scholars focus on the president’s ability 
to use presidential rhetorical powers to influence Congress and bring about his desired 
policy outcomes.  This research also has mixed results with some arguing that high 
presidential approval ratings lead to congressional passage of the presidential agenda 
(Brace and Hinckley 1992; Ostrom Jr and Simon 1985; Rivers and Rose 1985) and others 
arguing for a more nuanced view of presidential rhetorical powers that includes the 
dynamics of Congress and issue salience (Lockerbie et al. 1998; Borrelli and Simmons 
1993; Canes-Wrone 2006).    Edwards even contends that presidential rhetorical powers 
should no longer be considered an element of presidential leadership, since presidents 
lack the ability to persuade the public (Edwards 2009) 
 Taking an issue public is a risky proposition for any president.  Once an issue 
becomes publicized, defeat is also publicized (Kernell 1997).  ‘Staying private,’ or 
limiting the scope of conflict, may be the best option, depending on the goal a president 
seeks to achieve (Covington 1987).  Canes-Wrone (2006) uses a spatial model to develop 
a “Public Appeals Theory” of when and why a president uses appeals to the public.  She 
argues that under certain conditions a president can use his rhetorical skills to affect 
policy outcomes in Congress.  A president’s success from appealing to the public 
depends on strategically choosing initiatives that are complex and salient (Canes-Wrone 
and de Marchi 2008).  She also argues that if the president cannot alter existing opinion 
he has the incentive to publicize already popular initiatives in order to bolster public 
presidential approval.  Finally, she argues, a president should avoid publicizing unpopular 
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initiatives if citizens perceive that his policy goals differ from their own (Canes-Wrone 
2006).   
Jacobson has tracked the changes in partisanship among members of Congress 
and the electorate.  He shows that the ideological distance on a seven-point liberal-
conservative scale of the electoral constituencies of the two parties have more than 
doubled from 1972-2000.  He also shows that Congressional districts have become much 
more ideologically homogeneous.  As congressional districts have become more 
ideologically homogeneous, Congress has become more polarized.  More to the point, 
Jacobson finds, “…a discernable secular trend toward lower presidential approval by 
opposition party identifiers.” from 1952-2000 (Jacobson 2006).  Consistent with the 
evidence from the introduction (Kernell 2007), greater polarization among the electorate 
leads to less responsiveness from the electorate to a presidential appeal.  As the people 
become more ideologically heterogeneous, a president’s ability to persuade them will 
diminish.   
In her study on the use of presidential polls, Diane Heith used archived documents 
from the Nixon, Ford, Carter and Reagan administrations to examine how presidents use 
internal polls.  She finds that each of these presidents used internal polls after elections in 
order to identify their constituents and their preferences.  For example, after Nixon 
coined the phrase “Silent Majority,” his pollsters went to great lengths to identify them, 
not by party or group affiliation, but by their attitudes contrary to those of the students 
protesting against the Vietnam War.  The second major purpose of presidential polls is to 
allow the president to test phrases before major speeches to see how his target audience 
will respond.  In short, “Polls allow presidents to bridge the gap of understanding 
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between elites and masses and to create rhetoric that appeals to a supportive audience for 
proposed policies.”  Internal polls are used by presidents to identify their constituents, 
identify their constituent preferences, and shape the message their constituents hear to 
maintain or increase their support (Heith 2000).  Jacobs and Shapiro concur.  They argue 
that presidents carefully track public opinion in order to identify the words, arguments 
and symbols that are most likely to win public support for their desired policies.  Their 
analysis of the use of internal polling from Kennedy to Reagan led them to conclude that 
the White House is better positioned than in the past to manipulate public opinion, and 
that presidents use internal polls to design the presentation of already decided policies 
(Shapiro and Jacobs 2002). 
Modern presidents make public appeals more frequently than early presidents, but 
the evidence suggests presidents have very limited capacity to move general public 
opinion (Edwards 2003).  This paradox can be explained with a more precise 
understanding of the purpose behind presidential appeals to the public.  The current 
literature emphasizes the presidents’ ability to move general public opinion, in this thesis, 
I argue for a different interpretation of presidential rhetorical powers.  I argue that when 
presidents appeal to the public, they are not really trying to appeal to the general 
population; they are appealing to their core constituents—the party base and those who 
were strong and early supporters of the president. 
The enormous increase in spending on presidential polling adds to the credence of 
my hypothesis.  Presidents spend more money on internal polls, because the polls are 
working as expected.  Presidents today are likely to use their internal polls for the same 
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purposes that presidents in the past used internal polls; to build their constituent base and 
to help them shape their message. 
 
Framing and Priming Effects 
 Framing is a psychological tool that presidents use to shape public opinion among 
their core constituents.  Framing is different from persuasion.  There are two types of 
framing effects, equivalency (valence) framing and issue framing effects.  Equivalency 
framing occurs when the same information is presented in a more positive or more 
negative way in order to change the way a person thinks about that information.  
Equivalency frames can override individual preferences and cause people to respond to 
the loudest or last frame (Druckman 2004).2  Chong and Druckman argue that issue 
frames and priming describe the same process and the two terms can be used 
interchangeably (Chong and Druckman 2007).   
 Meanwhile, “…priming occurs when media attention to an issue causes people to 
place special weight on it when constructing evaluations of overall presidential job 
performance.”  When a mass communication places greater emphasis on an issue, that 
issue will receive greater weight and attention from the public (Miller and Krosnick 
2000).  The media’s greatest impact is not in changing people’s minds, but in influencing 
the importance voters place on issues (Kelleher and Wolak 2006; Zaller 1992).   
 Issue framing is a tool used by elites to alter the weight and importance of 
considerations.  Political elites frame issues in a particular way not only to simplify issues 
for the public, but to circumscribe the considerations they take seriously (Nelson and 
                                                 
2
 Equivalency frames are not an effective tool for presidential rhetoric, I mention them here to keep my 
concept of issue framing clear. 
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Kinder 1996).  “He who determines what politics is about runs the country” 
(Schattschneider 1960).  When elites hold up a clear picture of what is to be done, the 
public tends to see things from that point of view.   
 Ambivalence in the electorate does not come from ignorance, but from the 
inability to commit unequivocally to a single policy position.  Frames provide the 
direction for resolving this uncertainty in opinion by giving guidance about the relevance 
of these clashing considerations (Nelson and Kinder 1996).  Issue content also seems to 
matter.  Familiar and understandable issues are more likely to be primed than complex 
and difficult issues.  An issue is advantageous for a candidate to prime when the public 
gives high evaluations to the candidate’s handling of the issue, when the public supports 
the candidate’s position on the issue, or when the public ranks the issue as politically 
important.  The president can also emphasize bold  and aggressive foreign policy 
initiatives to prime his image as an effective leader (Druckman et al. 2008).  Iyengar 
offers two important caveats relevant to the thesis of this paper.  First, people are less 
susceptible to framing influences when the issue is highly familiar and second, 
preexisting beliefs moderate framing effects (Iyengar 1991).   
 
 
Implications for Presidential Influence 
 This discussion provides a theoretical foundation for some hypotheses about a 
president’s use of his rhetorical powers to solidify support among his core constituents.  
If a president were to detect from an internal poll that certain members of his core 
constituency were ambivalent toward a particular issue, the president could use a 
 9
presidential address, or a series of presidential addresses to frame the issue in a way that 
increased support among his base for a particular policy issue.  The issue would have to 
be a familiar and uncomplicated issue that his base constituents believe the president is 
capable of handling, or it would have to be a bold foreign policy initiative.   
This is precisely what happened during President Bush’s 2005 campaign for Social 
Security reform.  By the end of 2004, the public was growing tired of the war in Iraq, and 
support for the war was beginning to fade.  Though the president might have chosen to 
focus his attention on foreign policy initiatives, as many previous presidents have, Bush 
had campaigned on his domestic policy agenda and thought he had a mandate to reform 
Social Security (Alberts 2005).  A CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll conducted Dec. 12-14, 
2004 showed that a majority of US adults disapproved of the decision to go to war in Iraq 
(Report 2009a).  At approximately the same time, a Fox News poll conducted Dec. 14-15, 
2009 showed that 60% of US adults thought that people should have the choice to invest 
their Social Security contributions.  In addition, 74% of those surveyed by ABC 
News/Washington Post between Dec. 16-19, 2004 thought that the Social Security 
program was either “in crisis” or had “major problems” (Report 2009b).  For a president 
that has just won an election, and is looking for an area in which to solidify his base and 
implement a policy agenda that will leave a lasting legacy, Social Security seemed to be 
the perfect issue.  It was a salient, simply understood issue and the public’s support of 
Bush in the previous election seemed to confirm that they trusted him on this issue.  
Thus, President Bush used frequent, public appeals to frame the issues in the Social 
Security debate in a way that would increase support for his policy proposal among his 
core constituency. 
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The 2005 Campaign to Reform Social Security 
In his book, Governing by Campaigning, Edwards (2007) documents the attempt by 
President Bush in 2005 to move public opinion on Social Security Reform.  According to 
Edwards, President Bush began his second term with less public support than other 
recently elected incumbents, without a clear mandate, and saw a dramatic decrease in his 
approval ratings drop as he tried to advance his domestic agenda.  Congruent with the 
dominant view on presidential rhetoric, Edwards argues that Bush failed because he 
misread the public agenda and did not have high enough approval ratings to move public 
opinion.  The strongest empirical evidence to support Edwards claim is a poll conducted 
by Pew Research Group in May 2005.  They found, that by a 53% to 36% margin, 
Americans generally favored the idea of privatized social security accounts, but when the 
same idea is preceded by the phrase "George W. Bush has proposed..." the public was 
divided (45% in favor, 43% opposed) (Pew 2005).  George W. Bush began his public 
campaign to change Social Security in January of 2005, this poll taken four months later 
is evidence that public support for the president’s plan decreased when it was associated 
with him.  By the end of his second term, Bush seems to agree with Edwards’ 
assessment.  In his final press briefing at the White House, when asked about mistakes he 
made as President, George W. Bush replied: 
 “I believe that running the Social Security idea right after the '04 elections was a 
mistake.  I should have argued for immigration reform.  And the reason why is, is that 
-- you know, one of the lessons I learned as governor of Texas, by the way, is 
legislative branches tend to be risk-adverse.  In other words, sometimes legislatures 
have the tendency to ask, why should I take on a hard task when a crisis is not 
imminent?  And the crisis was not imminent for Social Security as far as many 
members of Congress was concerned” (Bush 2009). 
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As presumptuous as it may seem to argue with Bush’s ex-post evaluation of the 
situation, I argue that Bush believed he had a mandate from the public following the 2004 
presidential election.  In addition, Bush wanted to shift the public’s focus away from the 
Iraq War and to establish a conservative legacy by reforming Social Security.  The next 
sentence from Bush’s statement above confirms that by 2009 he still thought that the 
2004 presidential campaign was about Social Security; Bush continues: 
“As an aside, one thing I proved is that you can actually campaign on the issue and 
get elected.  In other words, I don't believe talking about Social Security is the third 
rail of American politics.  I, matter of fact, think that in the future, not talking about 
how you intend to fix Social Security is going to be the third rail of American politics 
(Bush 2009).” 
George W. Bush spent the 2004 presidential election campaigning on his domestic policy 
agenda.  It is not astonishing, therefore, that he interpreted his victory in the election as a 
mandate to implement his domestic policy agenda.  He had become the first president 
since his father to win the presidential election with an outright majority, his party gained 
seats in the House and Senate, and rightfully felt like he had earned some “political 
capital” (Lindberg 2004; Monitor 2004).  When Bush said that he would “spend it,” he 
meant that he was going to implement the domestic agenda on which he had campaigned.  
His presidential strategy for implementing this policy involved a series of public 
addresses, rallies, and a State of the Union address.  President Bush used internal polls to 
identify the language and symbols he should use to construct his message, and then used 
a series of public addresses to frame the issue for his base constituents.  Potential change 
in opinion among George W. Bush’s base before and after the public campaign provides 
the test for my hypotheses.   
Hypotheses   
 12
 The preceding discussion allows for the formulation of specific hypotheses.  The 
dominant view concerning presidential rhetorical skill does not differentiate between 
support for the president among base constituents and support for the president among 
the general public, it should not be taken as a given that a president’s base will support 
the president.  Consistent with the dominant view, we should expect that as general 
support for a president declines support for the president among his base constituents 
should also decline. 
 
Hypothesis 1) General support may decline, but support for Bush’s plan will increase 
among his base after his public campaign to reform Social Security. 
 
Hypothesis 1 is a test of the idea that President Bush was appealing to his base as 
opposed to the general public.  Though a decline in general public support for President 
Bush’s Social Security reform package has been documented, an increase in support for 
this proposal among his base shows that his appeals to the base were effective.  It would 
confirm that presidential rhetorical powers have not diminished over time; they are 
simply most effective among the base constituents of a president. 
Hypothesis 2) George W. Bush’s base will be more likely to support a plan that 
includes his name as the author of the plan than a plan presented without his name. 
 
This second hypothesis tests how effective the president uses issue framing to solidify 
support among the base.  Individuals may not be aware of the specific details of President 
Bush’s proposals, but they know that they trust him and they are supportive of the plan he 
proposed.  This shows that the symbols, words, and ideas President Bush used in his 
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public appeals were effective in increasing support for his proposal among those to whom 
they were targeted. 
 
Variable Conceptualization and Measurement  
 The test for my first hypothesis comes from a dataset that was created by pooling 
responses from two different surveys collected for the Pew Research Center by Princeton 
Survey Research International.  The first survey was conducted from December 1 to 
December 16, 2004 using telephone interviews of a nationally representative sample of 
2,000 adults living in the US.  The second survey was conducted from February 16 to 
February 21, 2005 using telephone interviews of a nationally representative sample of 
1,502 adults living in the US.  Each survey asked a question with the same wording that 
measured the level of support for private social security accounts (see Appendix for full 
question wording).  I created a pooled database that has the responses for this question 
(coded 1 if they support the proposal and 0 if they do not).  The response to this question 
in the February survey is the dependent variable for my model that tests Hypothesis 1.  
The survey in December was conducted before George W. Bush began his public 
campaign for his social security proposal.  During the period between these two surveys 
President Bush gave a State of the Union address, several televised addresses and 
conducted his “60 stops in 60 days” campaign to promote his social security proposal 
(Edwards and King 2007).  The February, 2005 survey is an opportunity to test the effect 
President Bush’s public campaign for Social Security reform had on public opinion.   
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Independent Variables: Edwards (2007) has already documented the decline in general 
public opinion following this public campaign, but I test the effect this public campaign 
had on support among George W. Bush’s core partisan constituents.  The dependent 
variable is dichotomous, so I use a Logit model.  I use the standard controls for age, 
income and education.  Education is a 1 to 7 point scale with 1 representing those with no 
education or only grades 1-8, and 7 representing those that have completed any post-
graduate training.  The independent variable ‘February Respondent’ represents 
individuals who took part in the February 2005 survey.  This is a dichotomous variable 
coded 0 for those who took the survey in December 2004 and 1 for participants in the 
February survey.  Given the general trend of opinion, I expect those who were surveyed 
in February to be less likely to support the reform proposal. 
 ‘Heard Proposal’ is also a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the respondent heard 
about Bush’s proposal and 0 if they had not.  Respondents were also coded 1 if female 
and 0 if male.  George W. Bush split the Hispanic and Asian vote, but eight out of ten 
African Americans supported Bush’s opponent (McFadden et al. 2004).  For this reason, 
race was coded 1 for African American respondents and 0 for everyone else; this 
magnifies the effect of race allowing for more stringent control.   
 Other variables are included that would capture support from George W. Bush’s 
core constituents.  In the 2004 presidential election, four out of five of those who 
attended church at least once a week voted for Bush (Langfitt 2004).  The variable 
Church Attendance is a scale with 1 representing those that attend church once a week 
and 6 representing those that never attend church.  Although George W. Bush received a 
lot of support from voters of all religious groups, white born-again Christian voters were 
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his strongest supporters (Goodstein et al. 2004).  For this reason, I include a variable that 
is coded 1 for born-again Christians and zero for all other religious affiliations.  Finally, I 
include variables designed to capture political ideology and party identification.  The 
variable Democrat is coded 1 if a respondent is a Democrat and 0 for all other responses, 
Republican is coded the same with 1 representing Republicans.  Ideology is a 1 to7 point 
scale with 1 being very conservative and 7 being very liberal.   
 The results presented in Table 1 show some preliminary support for Hypothesis 
1.  Overall, those that heard about the Social Security proposal were less likely to support 
the Social Security proposal after the State of the Union address in February 2005.  In 
addition, the more ideologically liberal, the more likely a respondent is to oppose the 
proposal after hearing the State of the Union address.  The coefficient for those that 
approve of George W. Bush in the survey indicates that they were more likely to support 
his proposal. 
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Results and Discussion 
Table 1: Support for Social Security Proposal after 2005 State of the Union 
Independent Variables 
 
             Support Proposal 
 
February Respondent -0.375** 
(0.101) 
Heard Proposal -0.282** 
(0.077) 
Gender: Female -0.055 
(0.102) 
Age -0.035** 
(0.004) 
Education 0.029 
(0.036) 
Race: African American 0.004 
(0.164) 
Religion: Born Again 0.110 
(0.117) 
Have Children: Yes -0.083 
(0.114) 
Church Attendance 0.013 
(0.035) 
Income 0.054* 
(0.025) 
Party ID: Republican 0.857** 
(0.143) 
Party ID: Democrat -0.231# 
(0.121) 
Ideology: ^ liberal -0.148* 
(0.061) 
Approve of Bush: Yes 1.311** 
(0.126) 
 
 
Note: Coefficients are logit coefficients.  The appendix contains full question 
wording and coding.  Standard errors are in parentheses.   
**p<.01; *p,.05; #p<.10 
 
 
A more efficient way to identify Bush’s core supporters requires the use of 
interactive terms.  Whenever a hypothesis is conditional in nature, it is best to use an 
interactive term (Brambor et al. 2006).  Hypothesis 1 states that support for the Social 
Security proposal will increase among President Bush’s core constituents in February 
2005.  Stated as a conditional hypothesis we can suggest that an increase in support for 
the Social Security Reform plan will be detected in the survey conducted after George W. 
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Bush’s State of the Union address if the person expressing support is a member of 
George W. Bush’s base (Republicans and those who approve of Bush), but this will not 
happen if the person is not a member of President Bush’s base.  To measure support for 
members of President Bush’s base, I created three dichotomous interactive variables.  
The first interactive variable combines those who approve of George W. Bush with 
taking part in the February 2005 survey (coded 1=took survey in February, 0=took 
December survey).  This allows me to capture the difference in support for the proposal 
among those that approved of the president.  The second interactive variable combines 
Republicans with those that heard about the Social Security proposal.  The third 
interactive variable combines those that approve of Bush with those that heard the Social 
Security proposal.  These final two interactive variables allow me to see the base separate 
from the general public.   
 The results for my three interactive models are combined with the results from my 
preliminary analysis of Hypothesis 1 in Table 3 below.  Model 1 shows the results from 
Table 1.  Model 2 is the model with my first interactive term, Model 3 is the model that 
includes my second interactive variable, and Model 4 is the model that includes my third 
interactive term.   
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Table 2: Support for the Social Security Proposal in February 2005 
Independent 
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Took Survey in 
Feb. 2005 
-0.375 
(0.000) 
-0.543 
(0.000) 
-0.387 
(0.000) 
-0.383 
(0.000) 
Heard about 
Proposal 
 
-0.282 
(0.000) 
 
-0.279 
(0.000) 
 
-0.507 
(0.000) 
 
-0.817 
(0.000) 
Interactive: Bush 
Approval and 
Took Feb. 2005 
Survey 
  
 
0.382 
(0.057) 
  
Interactive: 
Republican and 
Q31 Heard about 
Proposal 
   
 
0.959 
(0.000) 
 
Interactive: 
Approve of Bush 
and Q31 Heard 
about Proposal 
    
 
1.259 
(0.000) 
Note: Full results from all models available in Appendix.  P-values are in 
parentheses below the estimate for the coefficient from the model. 
 
The results from maximum likelihood estimation reported in Table 2 confirm Hypothesis 
1.  Though the interactive term in model 2 is not statistically significant at the p. <.05 
level, it is in the expected direction.  Table 2 shows that respondents that heard about 
George W. Bush’s Social Security proposal were likely to oppose the proposal in 
February, 2005 following his public campaign.  Those that were a part of George W. 
Bush’s core constituency, however, were statistically more likely to favor the proposal 
after the public campaign.  This shows that if George W. Bush was targeting his core 
constituents in his State of the Union address, he was successful.  
 
Secondary Analysis 
The data used to test my second hypothesis comes from data collected by The 
Pew Research Center.  Princeton Survey Research Associates conducted a telephone 
survey among a nationwide sample of 1,502 adults age 18 or older from May 11-15, 
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2005.  One of the questions asked half of the respondents if they favored a particular 
proposal for reforming Social Security with no mention of President Bush’s name.  The 
rest of the respondents were asked the same question with the proposal being attributed to 
President Bush by name.  Since my dependent variable is dichotomous (1=Question 
w/Bush, 0=Question w/no Bush), a maximum likelihood Logit model is the most 
appropriate test.  Table 3 below shows the results from the basic Logit model.  I coded 
the variables the same as I coded them for my previous model.  I also included a 
dichotomous variable for those that received the treatment.  Those that heard the question 
with the proposal being attributed to George W. Bush were coded 1 and those that heard 
the proposal attributed to no one were coded 0.  The model also includes a variable to 
account for the effects of having a retirement plan other than Social Security.  This was 
coded 1 if the respondent had no retirement plan, 2 if they had a retirement plan, but it 
was not invested in the stock market, and 3 for those that had a retirement plan invested 
in the stock market.  
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Table 3: Support for Social Security Proposal When Attributed to Bush 
Independent Variables 
 
 Support Proposal 
 
Attributed to Bush: Yes -0.324* 
(0.140) 
Heard Proposal 0.109 
(0.110) 
Gender: Female -0.175 
(0.142) 
Age 0.002 
(0.004) 
Education 0.051 
(0.051) 
Race: African American -0.371 
(0.249) 
Religion: Born Again 0.325* 
(0.166) 
Have Children: Yes 0.073 
(0.165) 
Church Attendance -0.103* 
(0.052) 
Income -0.115** 
(0.039) 
Party ID: Republican 0.122 
(0.195) 
Party ID: Democrat -0.293 
(0.183) 
Ideology: Scale 0.022 
(0.089) 
Approve of Bush: Yes 0.176 
(0.186) 
Ideology: Conservative 0.809 
(0.527) 
Have a Retirement Plan  
Other than Social Security 
0.002 
(0.090) 
Note: Coefficients are logit coefficients.  The appendix contains full question 
wording and coding.  Standard errors are in parentheses.   
**p<.01; *p,.05; #p<.10 
 
Table 3 confirms the results often cited in the literature as evidence that George 
W. Bush was unsuccessful in his public campaign to reform Social Security (Edwards 
2007; Kernell 2007), overall those that heard the proposal attributed to George W. Bush 
were less likely to support the proposal than those that heard the proposal without the 
president’s name.  Interestingly, regular church attendance was negatively associated 
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with support for the plan as was income.  These two groups were generally strong 
supporters of George W. Bush.  President Bush’s strongest supporters, born-again 
Christians, were more likely to support the proposal.  These results show mixed support 
for Hypothesis 2. 
A more efficient way to identify Bush’s core supporters requires the use of 
interactive terms.  Whenever a hypothesis is conditional in nature, it is best to use an 
interactive term (Brambor et al. 2006).  Hypothesis 2 states that support for the plan will 
be greater among Bush’s base; stated as a conditional hypothesis: if a member of 
President Bush’s core constituency hears the Social Security proposal attributed to the 
president, they will be more likely to favor the proposal.  Those that are not members of 
George W. Bush’s core constituency will behave the same as the general public and will 
be less likely to support the proposal when it is attributed to the president.  I created four 
dichotomous interactive terms.   
Model 1 in Table 4 contains all of the same independent variables from Table 3, 
but it also contains an interactive term that combines those that approve of Bush in the 
survey (coded 1 approve, zero do not approve) with those that received the treatment 
(proposal attributed to Bush).  This independent variable captures George W. Bush’s base 
by looking at those, regardless of party affiliation, who support the president.  The 
crudest definition of a president’s base is those who support the president; this 
independent variable captures those individuals.  Model 2 in Table 4 contains all of the 
independent variables from Table 3, but it also includes interactive terms that multiply 
Republican (coded 1 for Republican, 0 for all other party affiliations) with receiving the 
treatment (proposal attributed to Bush).  This term measures Republican support against 
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all others, including Independents.  Model 3 in Table 4 contains all of the independent 
variables from Table 3, but it includes a different interactive term, which multiplies 
Democrat (coded 1 for Democrats, and 0 for all other party affiliations) with receiving 
the treatment.  Like the Republican interactive term, this one compares those of the 
opposition party with all other respondents, regardless of party affiliation.  The idea of 
party polarization is implicit in my hypotheses.  This term will allow me to see if the 
“opposite” of the President’s base behaves in a manner consistent with my hypotheses, in 
the opposite direction.   
The final model, model 4, contains all of the independent variables from Table 3 
with a different interactive term, which multiplies ideology (measured on a scale with 1 
representing very conservative, and 5 representing very liberal) with receiving the 
treatment.  This term will capture those that may be members of the president’s base that 
do not affiliate with a party, but share the president’s conservative ideology.  Since the 
most conservative individuals are given the lowest score and President Bush was 
conservative, I expect the sign on the coefficient to be negative.  A positive coefficient 
would suggest that individuals that are more liberal are more likely to support a policy 
when Bush’s name is included as the proponent.  I expect the opposite to be true.  The 
independent variable for this model is also dichotomous.  Of those who received the 
treatment (Social Security proposal attributed to George W. Bush), do they approve or 
disapprove of the plan (coded 1 = approve, 0=disapprove).  Table 4 below shows the 
results of these models. 
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Table 4: Support for the Social Security Proposal When Attributed to Bush: 
 
IV 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Proposal 
Attributed to 
Bush 
 
-0.989 
(0.000) 
 
-0.914 
(0.000) 
 
0.159 
(0.361) 
 
1.771 
(0.000) 
 
Approve of Bush * 
Attributed to 
Bush 
 
1.306 
(0.000) 
   
 
Republican * 
Attributed to 
Bush 
  
1.695 
(0.000) 
  
 
Democrat * 
Attributed to 
Bush 
   
-1.411 
(0.000) 
 
 
Conservative-
Liberal * 
Attributed to 
Bush 
    
-0.770 
(0.000) 
Note: Full results available in Appendix.  Table reports coefficients with     
p-values in parentheses.   
 
In the experimental condition where one group of respondents heard the question 
about Social Security reform attributed to Bush and the other group heard the same 
question attributed to no one, these interactive terms are statistically significant.  As 
Table 4 illustrates, being a member of the George W. Bush’s core constituency predicts 
stronger support for the president’s proposals.  Hypothesis 2 is confirmed.  From Table 4 
it is clear that those who identified themselves as Republicans and those that said that 
they approved of President Bush responded differently to the treatment than the rest of 
the respondents.  In general, a respondent that heard about the Social Security plan 
attributed to George W. Bush was statistically less likely to support the plan than those 
that heard about the plan with no attribution to George W. Bush.  The negative sign on 
the coefficient from Table 3 confirms this.   
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The interactive terms in models 1 and 2 from Table 4 identify respondents that are 
members of George W. Bush’s core constituency.  These respondents were statistically 
more likely to support the Social Security plan when it was attributed to George W. Bush 
than those who heard it with no attribution.  In addition, the negative signs on the 
coefficients for the interactive terms from models 3 and 4 in Table 4 confirm that those 
who are liberal and those who identified themselves as Democrats were statistically less 
likely to support the proposal when it was attributed to George W. Bush.  Showing that 
these interactive terms are statistically significant is an important beginning to the 
analysis, but it alone does not describe the relationship between the variables.  The next 
portion of my analysis will use post-estimation techniques to estimate the differences of 
the effects of the interactive terms. 
Using the Zelig package in R it is possible to simulate predicted probabilities for 
each independent variable in my models (Kosuke Imai 2009).  Though it is impossible to 
hold all things constant in the equations used to derive the coefficient estimates for 
models 1:4 reported in Table 2, and models 1:4 reported in Table 4, it is possible to 
simulate the predicted probabilities with margin of error estimates (Kosuke Imai 2008).  I 
used the mean value for each independent variable in my model and changed the value 
for the independent variables reported in Tables 5 and 6.  For example, the predicted 
level of support for someone identified as “very conservative” from model 3 of Table 4  
was derived by placing values for all independent variables at their mean and placing the 
value for the interactive variable “cons_lib * treatment” at 1, to represent those that were 
“very conservative”.  I ran the simulation 100,000 times and the software generated 
predicted levels of support for George W. Bush’s Social Security proposal and a margin 
 25
of error.  The same method was used to calculate the predicted level of support for each 
independent variable listed in Tables 5 and 6. 
 
Table 5: Predicted Levels of Support for Plan after State of the Union Address 
Independent Variable 
Probability of Supporting 
Proposal in Feb. 2005 
Margin of Error 
 
Approve of Bush 
 
0.79 
 
0.02 
 
Interactive: Approve of Bush 
and Surveyed After State of 
the Union  
 
0.70 
 
0.03 
Interactive: Republican and  
Heard Proposal 
 
 
0.76 
 
 
0.03 
Interactive: Approve of Bush 
and Heard Proposal 
 
0.75 
 
0.03 
 
Moderate 
 
0.57 
 
0.02 
 
Table 6: Predicted Levels of Support for Social Security Plan 
Independent Variable Probability of Supporting Margin of Error 
 
 
  
“Very Conservative” * 
Attributed to Bush 
0.66 0.02 
 
Approve of Bush * Attributed 
to Bush 
 
0.78 
 
0.04 
 
Republican * Attributed to 
Bush 
 
0.85 
 
0.03 
“Very Liberal” * Attributed to 
Bush 
0.09 0.05 
 
Democrat * Attributed to Bush 
 
0.31 
 
0.05 
 
 Tables 5 and 6 present the results of my simulations.  In table 5, the probability 
that an individual who approved of Bush would also support his plan to reform Social 
Security in February 2005 is 0.79 with a margin of error of plus or minus 0.02.  Likewise, 
the probability that someone who identified herself as ideologically moderate would 
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support President Bush’s proposal to reform Social Security in February 2005 was 0.57 
with a margin of error of plus or minus 0.02.  In table 6, the probability that someone 
who identified herself as very conservative and received the treatment would support 
President Bush’s proposal was 0.66 with a margin of error of plus or minus 0.02.  
Conversely, the probability that an individual that identified herself as very liberal and 
received the treatment would support President Bush’s proposal was 0.09 with a margin 
of error of plus or minus 0.05. 
 
Conclusion 
The dominant view on presidential rhetorical powers has shifted.  Neustadt 
showed how Truman was able to pressure Congress to pass the expensive Marshall Plan, 
despite his abysmal approval ratings, in part because of his appeals to the public 
(Neustadt 1980).  Cohen (1995) argues that U.S. presidents, regardless of popularity are 
able to sway public opinion through the State of the Union.  Meanwhile, Edwards (2003; 
2007; 2009) has shown that, since Reagan at least, U.S. presidents public addresses fail to 
move public opinion.  I argue that the shifting paradigm fails to recognize an important 
element of presidential rhetorical powers.  Though George W. Bush’s public campaign to 
reform Social Security was seen as a failure by himself and others, it demonstrates one 
realm in which U.S. presidents can exercise rhetorical powers.  This paper clearly 
demonstrates that George W.  Bush effectively framed the issue of Social Security to 
solidify support for his plan among his core constituents.  It is likely that President Bush 
had hoped for more of a shift in general public opinion, but his failure to move general 
public opinion should not be equated with complete failure. 
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 My results show that the longer President Bush campaigned to reform Social 
Security, the more the general public disliked his plan.  By May of 2005, just mentioning 
George W. Bush as the author of a plan to privatize Social Security caused support to 
drop by 11% (Pew 2005).   
But my results also demonstrate that George W. Bush’s public campaign to 
reform Social Security was very effective among his base.  In May 2005, a conservative 
person was 21% more likely to support a plan that included Bush’s name than the rest of 
the population.  Those who approved of George W. Bush’s performance as president 
were 33% more likely to approve of a plan that included his name and Republicans were 
40% more likely to approve of a plan that included his name.  Conversely, Democrats 
were 14% more likely to oppose a plan that mentioned President Bush’s name and those 
who described themselves as “very liberal” were 36% less likely to support the plan when 
it was attributed to George W. Bush.  This demonstrates that general public opinion 
headed in one direction, and the opinion of Bush’s core constituents went strongly in the 
opposite direction.  This finding not only confirms my hypotheses that George W. Bush 
was effective at framing the Social Security issue for his core constituents to increase 
support for his proposal among them.  It also suggests that the dominant view of 
presidential rhetorical powers is insufficient.   
This thesis can be seen as the beginning of a more specific approach to the study 
of presidential rhetorical powers.  Instead of concluding that the powers do not exist 
because presidents fail to move overall public opinion (Edwards 2009), I suggest that it is 
beneficial to look for the contingent and specific benefits presidents receive from appeals 
to the public.  As Edwards (2007) has documented, modern U.S. presidents appeal to the 
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public with greater frequency than early U.S. presidents.  The evidence presented in this 
thesis demonstrates that aggregate opinion may be deceptive.  Modern technology and 
internal polls give U.S. presidents opportunities to frame public addresses to their core 
constituents.  Presidential rhetorical powers should be measured by the effect of public 
appeals on the opinion of the president’s core constituents and not by the effect on 
general public opinion or the opinions of members of Congress. 
 In addition, this research fills in some of the gaps of previous research on framing 
effects.  Druckman and Holmes (2004) argue that President Bush effectively framed 
issues in his 2002 State of the Union address and moved general public opinion.  Iyengar 
(1991) argues that preexisting beliefs moderate framing effects.  My findings point to 
some of the limitations of framing effects.  Members of George W. Bush’s core 
constituents were 20% more likely to approve of the Bush proposal after the February 
2005 State of the Union address than were moderates.  As Table 1 indicates, those that 
approved of George W. Bush before his State of the Union address were more likely to 
approve of his plan after the State of the Union address, while everyone else was more 
likely to disapprove of his plan after the State of the Union address.  These results refute 
the findings of Cohen (1995) that presidential popularity and issue selection do not limit 
the effectiveness of presidential rhetoric in public addresses.  In addition, my results 
indicate that the findings of Druckman and Holmes (2004) are more likely the result of an 
exceptional post-September 11, 2001 public mood than a general substantive effect.   
 My analyses suggest that preexisting beliefs are important moderators of framing 
effects.  In general, what a person thinks about the messenger influences the frames 
through which the things said by that individual are received.  In short, even U.S. 
 29
presidents are limited in their ability to frame issues for the general public.  Future studies 
of presidential framing should recognize this empirical evidence.  If the U.S. electorate is 
becoming more polarized as has been suggested (Jacobson 2006; Abramowitz 2010), 
U.S. presidents should not be expected to frame issues for the general public.   
 This thesis also provides some empirical support to Heith’s (2000) work on 
presidential polling.  My results indicate that U.S. presidents do indeed conduct internal 
polls to “identify their constituents, identify their constituent preferences, and shape the 
message their constituents hear to increase presidential support among the base.”  It 
appears that presidents make public appeals because these appeals allow them to 
accomplish their goals of framing the issues and increasing support for their proposals 
among their core constituents. 
 Although much research has focused on presidential rhetorical powers as they 
relate to legislative outcomes.  Future research in the legislative outcome focus of 
presidential rhetorical powers could examine the way that moving public opinion among 
the base would influence legislation.  However, my findings indicate that a new direction 
is needed for studies of presidential rhetorical powers.  Since U.S. presidents are unlikely 
to be able to move overall public opinion in the future, further research could attempt to 
explore the conditions under which a president would fail to move public opinion among 
his base supporters.  Though much research on issue framing and its effects has been 
conducted, it would be instructive to identify more specifically the limits of presidential 
rhetorical powers. 
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Appendix A 
PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS 
DECEMBER 2004 POLITICAL TYPOLOGY SURVEY 
FINAL QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Poll 1 was a telephone survey conducted under the direction of Princeton Survey 
Research Associates International among a nationwide sample of 2,000 adults, 18 
years of age or older, during the period Dec. 1-16, 2004. 
 
On another subject... 
Q.31 How much, if anything, have you heard about a proposal which would allow younger 
workers to invest a portion of their Social Security taxes in private retirement accounts, 
which might include stocks or mutual funds — a lot, a little or nothing at all? {9-04 RVs 
modified} 
 
1 A lot 
2 A little 
3 Nothing at all 
9 Don't know/Refused 
 
Q.32 Generally, do you favor or oppose this proposal? {9-04 RVs; 9-00 RVs} 
 
1 Favor 
2 Oppose 
9 Don't know/Refused 
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Appendix B 
 
Stata Output for Logit Model Described in Table 1 
 
Output for Dec 04 (time 1) and Feb 05 (time 2) Analysis: Basic model 
 
. logit  q32sspro_favor feb_survey q31heardss  female age2 education  black 
children bor 
> nagain churchattend income2 republican democrat cons_lib bushfavor 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -1588.0899 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -1261.0065 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -1247.1331 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -1246.8958 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -1246.8957 
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       2358 
                                                  LR chi2(14)     =     682.39 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -1246.8957                       Pseudo R2       =     0.2148 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
q32sspro_f~r |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  feb_survey |  -.3753714    .101803    -3.69   0.000    -.5749016   -.1758413 
  q31heardss |  -.2824517   .0765001    -3.69   0.000    -.4323892   -.1325143 
      female |  -.0551789   .1017803    -0.54   0.588    -.2546647    .1443068 
        age2 |  -.0352189   .0035355    -9.96   0.000    -.0421484   -.0282893 
   education |   .0290637   .0355219     0.82   0.413    -.0405578    .0986853 
       black |   .0042708   .1642498     0.03   0.979    -.3176529    .3261946 
    children |  -.0829155    .113777    -0.73   0.466    -.3059143    .1400833 
   bornagain |    .110289   .1174607     0.94   0.348    -.1199298    .3405077 
churchattend |   .0129344   .0352284     0.37   0.713    -.0561119    .0819808 
     income2 |    .053922   .0253397     2.13   0.033      .004257     .103587 
  republican |     .85745   .1430723     5.99   0.000     .5770335    1.137867 
    democrat |  -.2314408   .1207608    -1.92   0.055    -.4681276    .0052459 
    cons_lib |  -.1477644   .0606377    -2.44   0.015     -.266612   -.0289167 
   bushfavor |   1.311498   .1262931    10.38   0.000     1.063968    1.559028 
       _cons |   2.065904   .3504558     5.89   0.000     1.379023    2.752785 
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Appendix C 
 
Stata Output for Models Described in Table 2 
 
Table 2, Model 2: 
 
Interaction Bush approval and Feb Survey 
 
. logit  q32sspro_favor feb_survey q31heardss  female age2 education  black 
children bor 
> nagain churchattend income2 republican democrat cons_lib bushfavor   
bush_survey 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -1588.0899 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -1258.6864 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -1245.3053 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -1245.0802 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -1245.0801 
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       2358 
                                                  LR chi2(15)     =     686.02 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -1245.0801                       Pseudo R2       =     0.2160 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
q32sspro_f~r |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  feb_survey |  -.5431092   .1351216    -4.02   0.000    -.8079428   -.2782757 
  q31heardss |  -.2797742   .0764588    -3.66   0.000    -.4296308   -.1299177 
      female |  -.0504188   .1019666    -0.49   0.621    -.2502697    .1494321 
        age2 |  -.0351136   .0035398    -9.92   0.000    -.0420516   -.0281757 
   education |   .0279463   .0355623     0.79   0.432    -.0417545    .0976471 
       black |     .00489   .1646276     0.03   0.976    -.3177743    .3275542 
    children |  -.0809254   .1139822    -0.71   0.478    -.3043264    .1424756 
   bornagain |   .1071434   .1175664     0.91   0.362    -.1232825    .3375694 
churchattend |   .0139486   .0352832     0.40   0.693    -.0552051    .0831024 
     income2 |   .0529232   .0253877     2.08   0.037     .0031643    .1026821 
  republican |   .8466424   .1429532     5.92   0.000     .5664593    1.126826 
    democrat |  -.2409765   .1210906    -1.99   0.047    -.4783097   -.0036434 
    cons_lib |  -.1510307   .0607222    -2.49   0.013     -.270044   -.0320174 
   bushfavor |   1.145589   .1526297     7.51   0.000     .8464401    1.444737 
 bush_survey |   .3823219   .2010251     1.90   0.057    -.0116799    .7763238 
       _cons |   2.147592      .3541     6.06   0.000     1.453569    2.841616 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table 2, Model 3: 
 
Interactions republican and heard about proposal 
. logit  q32sspro_favor feb_survey q31heardss  female age2 education  black 
children bor 
> nagain churchattend income2 republican democrat cons_lib bushfavor   
rep_q31heard 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -1588.0899 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -1241.5796 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -1228.2823 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -1228.0654 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -1228.0653 
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       2358 
                                                  LR chi2(15)     =     720.05 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -1228.0653                       Pseudo R2       =     0.2267 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
q32sspro_f~r |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  feb_survey |  -.3871708   .1031701    -3.75   0.000    -.5893804   -.1849611 
  q31heardss |  -.5073101   .0859162    -5.90   0.000    -.6757029   -.3389174 
      female |    -.05176   .1029403    -0.50   0.615    -.2535192    .1499992 
        age2 |  -.0355585   .0035571   -10.00   0.000    -.0425303   -.0285868 
   education |   .0252949   .0358458     0.71   0.480    -.0449616    .0955515 
       black |  -.0398772   .1658871    -0.24   0.810      -.36501    .2852556 
    children |  -.0743826   .1143059    -0.65   0.515     -.298418    .1496528 
   bornagain |   .1113457   .1185594     0.94   0.348    -.1210266    .3437179 
churchattend |   .0222019   .0357416     0.62   0.534    -.0478503    .0922541 
     income2 |    .056023   .0255591     2.19   0.028      .005928     .106118 
  republican |  -1.324577    .368864    -3.59   0.000    -2.047537   -.6016165 
    democrat |  -.2603239    .122775    -2.12   0.034    -.5009586   -.0196893 
    cons_lib |  -.1228212   .0611569    -2.01   0.045    -.2426865   -.0029559 
   bushfavor |   1.311728   .1276038    10.28   0.000     1.061629    1.561827 
rep_q31heard |   .9589576    .154585     6.20   0.000     .6559766    1.261939 
       _cons |   2.478293    .361784     6.85   0.000     1.769209    3.187377 
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Table 2, Model 4: 
Interactions Bush approval and heard about proposal 
 
. logit  q32sspro_favor feb_survey q31heardss  female age2 education  black 
children bor 
> nagain churchattend income2 republican democrat cons_lib bushfavor   
bushapp_q31heard 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -1588.0899 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -1219.4099 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -1205.1597 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -1204.9095 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -1204.9094 
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       2358 
                                                  LR chi2(15)     =     766.36 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -1204.9094                       Pseudo R2       =     0.2413 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
q32sspro_f~r |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  feb_survey |  -.3830664   .1047808    -3.66   0.000    -.5884331   -.1776998 
  q31heardss |  -.8170104   .1000233    -8.17   0.000    -1.013052   -.6209684 
      female |  -.0438931   .1043011    -0.42   0.674    -.2483195    .1605333 
        age2 |  -.0363787   .0036026   -10.10   0.000    -.0434397   -.0293177 
   education |   .0173001   .0362652     0.48   0.633    -.0537784    .0883786 
       black |  -.1433728   .1695345    -0.85   0.398    -.4756543    .1889087 
    children |  -.0891931   .1155007    -0.77   0.440    -.3155702     .137184 
   bornagain |   .1110711   .1199255     0.93   0.354    -.1239785    .3461208 
churchattend |   .0300148   .0363192     0.83   0.409    -.0411696    .1011992 
     income2 |   .0571594   .0258875     2.21   0.027     .0064208     .107898 
  republican |   .7496723   .1438419     5.21   0.000     .4677474    1.031597 
    democrat |  -.2449406   .1240755    -1.97   0.048    -.4881242    -.001757 
    cons_lib |   -.080107   .0621741    -1.29   0.198    -.2019661     .041752 
   bushfavor |  -1.342069   .3139527    -4.27   0.000    -1.957405   -.7267335 
bushapp_q3~d |   1.259064   .1390435     9.06   0.000     .9865433    1.531584 
       _cons |   3.049601   .3805399     8.01   0.000     2.303756    3.795445 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix D 
 
PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS 
MAY 2005 NEWS INTEREST INDEX 
FINAL QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
The poll I call May, 2005 was based on telephone interviews conducted under the 
direction of Princeton Survey Research Associates International among a 
nationwide sample of 1,502 adults, 18 years of age or older, from May 11-15, 
2005. 
 
ASK FORM 1 [N=758]: 
Q.24F1    One proposal for dealing with Social Security's financial situation is to keep the 
system as it is now for lower income retirees, but limit the growth of future 
benefits for wealthy and middle income retirees.  Would you favor or oppose this 
proposal? 
 
ASK FORM 2 [N=744]: 
Q.24F2    George W. Bush has proposed dealing with Social Security's financial situation 
by keeping the system as it is now for lower income retirees, but limiting the 
growth of future benefits for wealthy and middle income retirees.  Would you 
favor or oppose this proposal? 
 
Q.39 Do you have a retirement plan besides Social Security?  [IF YES:  Is any of your 
retirement money in the stock market through stocks, mutual funds or a 401k 
plan?] {early 10-02} 
 
1 Yes, retirement plan in the stock market 
2 Yes, but not in stock market 
3 No, no retirement plan 
9 Don’t know/Refused 
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Appendix E 
 
Stata Output for Model in Table 3 
logit  q24sspropfavor form2 female age2 bushapprove q21heardss q39yesretireplan 
educat 
> ion black childrenyes bornagain churchattend income2 republican democrat 
cons_lib 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -602.24736 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -583.61449 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -583.56739 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -583.56739 
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        887 
                                                  LR chi2(15)     =      37.36 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0011 
Log likelihood = -583.56739                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0310 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
q24sspropf~r |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       form2 |  -.3241366   .1403787    -2.31   0.021    -.5992738   -.0489993 
      female |  -.1745575   .1424749    -1.23   0.221    -.4538032    .1046883 
        age2 |   .0017529   .0047943     0.37   0.715    -.0076438    .0111496 
 bushapprove |   .1760973    .185998     0.95   0.344    -.1884522    .5406468 
  q21heardss |   .1088005   .1102482     0.99   0.324    -.1072821     .324883 
q39yesreti~n |   .0017344   .0902732     0.02   0.985    -.1751978    .1786667 
   education |   .0508366   .0510954     0.99   0.320    -.0493085    .1509817 
       black |    -.37142   .2494836    -1.49   0.137    -.8603988    .1175589 
 childrenyes |   .0725398   .1652916     0.44   0.661    -.2514257    .3965053 
   bornagain |   .3248742   .1657489     1.96   0.050     .0000123    .6497361 
churchattend |  -.1026108    .051981    -1.97   0.048    -.2044918   -.0007298 
     income2 |   -.114983   .0388518    -2.96   0.003    -.1911311   -.0388349 
  republican |   .1219066   .1946856     0.63   0.531    -.2596701    .5034834 
    democrat |  -.2930556   .1833493    -1.60   0.110    -.6524136    .0663023 
    cons_lib |    .022292   .0889522     0.25   0.802    -.1520512    .1966352 
       _cons |   .8091066   .5270826     1.54   0.125    -.2239564     1.84217 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix F 
 
Stata Output for Models in Table 4: 
 
Model 1 
 
. logit  q24sspropfavor form2 female age2 bushapprove q21heardss 
q39yesretireplan educat 
> ion black childrenyes bornagain churchattend income2 republican democrat 
cons_lib  bushapprove_form2 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -602.24736 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -572.93982 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -572.83589 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -572.83587 
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        887 
                                                  LR chi2(16)     =      58.82 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -572.83587                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0488 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
q24sspropf~r |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       form2 |  -.9893895   .2040294    -4.85   0.000     -1.38928   -.5894993 
      female |  -.2140833   .1444935    -1.48   0.138    -.4972853    .0691188 
        age2 |   .0018813   .0048401     0.39   0.698    -.0076051    .0113678 
 bushapprove |  -.4619787   .2330427    -1.98   0.047     -.918734   -.0052234 
  q21heardss |   .1245311    .111643     1.12   0.265    -.0942852    .3433474 
q39yesreti~n |  -.0102031   .0913762    -0.11   0.911    -.1892972    .1688909 
   education |   .0422799   .0519973     0.81   0.416     -.059633    .1441928 
       black |  -.3683949   .2553011    -1.44   0.149    -.8687758     .131986 
 childrenyes |   .0920957   .1673362     0.55   0.582    -.2358773    .4200687 
   bornagain |     .30006   .1677528     1.79   0.074    -.0287295    .6288494 
churchattend |  -.1036107   .0526064    -1.97   0.049    -.2067174    -.000504 
     income2 |  -.1161361   .0394027    -2.95   0.003    -.1933639   -.0389083 
  republican |    .127368   .1960184     0.65   0.516    -.2568209     .511557 
    democrat |  -.2567396   .1866173    -1.38   0.169    -.6225028    .1090236 
    cons_lib |    .026291   .0900794     0.29   0.770    -.1502614    .2028434 
bushapprov~2 |   1.305711   .2837676     4.60   0.000     .7495371    1.861886 
       _cons |   1.158552   .5404579     2.14   0.032     .0992741     2.21783 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table 4, Model 2: 
 
. logit  q24sspropfavor form2 female age2 bushapprove q21heardss 
q39yesretireplan educat 
> ion black childrenyes bornagain churchattend income2 republican democrat 
cons_lib  rep 
> ublican_form2 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -602.24736 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -567.34901 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -567.16432 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -567.16426 
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        887 
                                                  LR chi2(16)     =      70.17 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -567.16426                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0583 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
q24sspropf~r |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       form2 |  -.9141789   .1770143    -5.16   0.000     -1.26112   -.5672373 
      female |  -.1988371   .1453165    -1.37   0.171    -.4836522     .085978 
        age2 |   .0017286   .0048761     0.35   0.723    -.0078284    .0112856 
 bushapprove |   .1837549   .1891687     0.97   0.331    -.1870088    .5545187 
  q21heardss |   .1266806   .1125619     1.13   0.260    -.0939367    .3472979 
q39yesreti~n |  -.0239692   .0921674    -0.26   0.795     -.204614    .1566756 
   education |   .0549111   .0524192     1.05   0.295    -.0478286    .1576509 
       black |   -.340723   .2541754    -1.34   0.180    -.8388976    .1574516 
 childrenyes |   .0644564   .1684769     0.38   0.702    -.2657522     .394665 
   bornagain |   .2907397   .1688882     1.72   0.085    -.0402751    .6217544 
churchattend |  -.0903836   .0529612    -1.71   0.088    -.1941855    .0134184 
     income2 |  -.1166765   .0395808    -2.95   0.003    -.1942534   -.0390996 
  republican |  -.7372982   .2462804    -2.99   0.003    -1.219999   -.2545975 
    democrat |  -.3092935   .1872597    -1.65   0.099    -.6763156    .0577287 
    cons_lib |   .0199456   .0906488     0.22   0.826    -.1577228     .197614 
republican~2 |   1.694815   .2994537     5.66   0.000     1.107896    2.281733 
       _cons |   1.104322   .5390299     2.05   0.040     .0478427    2.160801 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table 4, Model 3: 
 
. logit  q24sspropfavor form2 female age2 bushapprove q21heardss 
q39yesretireplan educat 
> ion black childrenyes bornagain churchattend income2 republican democrat 
cons_lib   de 
> mocrat_form2 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -602.24736 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -572.49568 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -572.41576 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -572.41575 
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        887 
                                                  LR chi2(16)     =      59.66 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -572.41575                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0495 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
q24sspropf~r |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       form2 |   .1589108   .1738547     0.91   0.361    -.1818381    .4996597 
      female |  -.2142633   .1446611    -1.48   0.139    -.4977939    .0692673 
        age2 |   .0028149   .0048628     0.58   0.563    -.0067159    .0123458 
 bushapprove |   .1365018   .1884807     0.72   0.469    -.2329135    .5059171 
  q21heardss |   .1089672   .1120309     0.97   0.331    -.1106093    .3285438 
q39yesreti~n |   .0175806   .0915137     0.19   0.848    -.1617831    .1969442 
   education |   .0397429   .0519945     0.76   0.445    -.0621645    .1416503 
       black |  -.3415972   .2566511    -1.33   0.183    -.8446241    .1614297 
 childrenyes |   .1128469   .1676921     0.67   0.501    -.2158236    .4415173 
   bornagain |   .2613401    .168086     1.55   0.120    -.0681024    .5907826 
churchattend |   -.102794    .052488    -1.96   0.050    -.2056687    .0000806 
     income2 |  -.1179983   .0394029    -2.99   0.003    -.1952266   -.0407699 
  republican |   .1385241   .1948142     0.71   0.477    -.2433047    .5203528 
    democrat |   .3989422   .2384339     1.67   0.094    -.0683797    .8662641 
    cons_lib |   .0217049   .0904141     0.24   0.810    -.1555036    .1989133 
democrat_f~2 |  -1.410737   .3025172    -4.66   0.000    -2.003659   -.8178137 
       _cons |   .5967902   .5344453     1.12   0.264    -.4507034    1.644284 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table 4, Model 4: 
. logit  q24sspropfavor form2 female age2 bushapprove q21heardss 
q39yesretireplan educat 
> ion black childrenyes bornagain churchattend income2 republican democrat 
cons_lib   co 
> ns_lib_form2 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -602.24736 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -572.20229 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -572.03796 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -572.03791 
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        887 
                                                  LR chi2(16)     =      60.42 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -572.03791                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0502 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
q24sspropf~r |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       form2 |   1.777063   .4668001     3.81   0.000     .8621513    2.691974 
      female |  -.1916656   .1444252    -1.33   0.184    -.4747338    .0914027 
        age2 |    .002606   .0048763     0.53   0.593    -.0069514    .0121634 
 bushapprove |   .1761764   .1879605     0.94   0.349    -.1922194    .5445721 
  q21heardss |   .1142398   .1119331     1.02   0.307     -.105145    .3336246 
q39yesreti~n |  -.0110925   .0915669    -0.12   0.904    -.1905602    .1683753 
   education |   .0439005   .0520315     0.84   0.399    -.0580793    .1458803 
       black |  -.3223541   .2527222    -1.28   0.202    -.8176805    .1729722 
 childrenyes |    .131117   .1680447     0.78   0.435    -.1982445    .4604786 
   bornagain |     .29892   .1674999     1.78   0.074    -.0293737    .6272137 
churchattend |  -.1041358   .0526444    -1.98   0.048     -.207317   -.0009546 
     income2 |  -.1147794   .0394462    -2.91   0.004    -.1920925   -.0374663 
  republican |   .1352876   .1961573     0.69   0.490    -.2491736    .5197488 
    democrat |   -.295861   .1865024    -1.59   0.113     -.661399    .0696769 
    cons_lib |   .4173274   .1253208     3.33   0.001     .1717031    .6629517 
cons_lib_f~2 |  -.7690331   .1638322    -4.69   0.000    -1.090138   -.4479279 
       _cons |  -.2666842    .575817    -0.46   0.643    -1.395265    .8618964 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
